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Teens, Porn, and Video Games:  
Is it Time to Rethink Ginsberg? 
 
John A. Humbach1  
 
 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association,2 a Ninth Circuit decision that struck down, on First Amendment 
grounds, a California statute prohibiting the sale or rental of certain “violent video 
games” to minors.3  In finding the California statute unconstitutional, the Court of 
Appeals distinguished Ginsberg v. New York, the 1968 case in which the Supreme Court 
first suggested that First Amendment protections of speech may apply less strictly to 
minors.4  The reason that the Ninth Circuit gave was that the Ginsberg Court had “placed 
the magazines at issue within a sub-category of obscenity--obscenity as to minors,” 
noting that the “Supreme Court has carefully limited obscenity to sexual content.”5  
However, this explanation does not provide any obvious policy reason for differentiating 
between allegedly harmful violent materials and allegedly harmful sex-themed materials.  
Because the case is highly problematic precedent, the Supreme Court should rethink 
Ginsberg when deciding Entertainment Merchants. 
The issue in Ginsberg was whether a state could validly prohibit the sale of 
“girlie” magazines to persons under age seventeen.6  The Court upheld the ban even 
though the magazines were “not obscene for adults,”7 reasoning that “even where there is 
                                                 
1
 Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. 
2
 Decided sub nom. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th 
Cir. 2009), aff’g 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
3
 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746–1746.5 (West 2006).  § 1746.1 provides that “[a] person may 
not sell or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video game to a minor.”  § 
1746(d)(1) defines “violent video game” as one in which players can engage on-screen in 
“killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a human being” in a 
manner that: 
 
(i) A reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find appeals to a 
deviant or morbid interest of minors [and] 
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is 
suitable for minors [and] 
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value for minors. 
 
The statute also contained an alternative definition of “violent video game,” but the state 
conceded its unconstitutionality, so it was not before the court.  Video Software, 556 F.3d 
at 956. 
4
 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
5
 Video Software, 556 F.3d at 959.  See infra text accompanying notes 12–13. 
6
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7
 Id. at 634. 
2 
an invasion of protected freedoms ‘the power of the state to control the conduct of 
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults . . . .’”8  In other words, 
Ginsberg authorized states to punish the dissemination of constitutionally protected 
material9 to adolescents and, inferentially, to deprive adolescents of the fundamental right 
to “view and observe” material of their own choosing. 10  Part of the Court’s rationale 
was that state legislatures have the power to “adjust” the constitutional definition of 
obscenity in order to regulate material that would otherwise fall within the area of 
constitutionally protected expression.11 
In Entertainment Merchants, the Ninth Circuit could have distinguished Ginsberg 
on the ground that California did not even purport to “adjust” the constitutional definition 
of obscenity.  Instead, it said the Ginsberg holding was limited and concerned only with 
“‘sex material’ as it relates to the interests of minors.”12  It declined to extend the 
Ginsberg rationale to “materials depicting violence,”13 although those materials 
potentially raise similar concerns about harm to minors.14  The Ninth Circuit did not 
provide a rationale for curtailing First Amendment interests in one instance and 
protecting those interests in the other. 
The opinion in Ginsberg, if not the result, is an odd duck in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  Ginsberg applied rational basis review in an area where the Supreme 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (upholding 
application of a child labor state law prohibiting children from distributing religious 
literature in the streets)).  
9
 Sexually-themed material is protected by the Constitution so long as it is not obscene. 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  Laws restricting such 
material on the basis of content are presumptively unconstitutional, and they can stand 
only if the governmental can show that they pass strict scrutiny.  Id. at 815.  
10
 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1969) (recognizing the individual’s 
fundamental right to “read or observe what he pleases”).  Stanley was decided a year after 
Ginsberg and the Court’s language gave no hint that the fundamental right confirmed in 
Stanley was age-contingent.  Assuming that Stanley did not implicitly overrule Ginsberg, 
then it seems still to be the law that minors do not have a fundamental right to view non-
obscene materials of their own choosing.  In other words, it seems that legislatures still 
are, per Ginsberg, fully empowered to determine and limit what minors have a right to 
read and view. 
Stanley actually went further than merely confirming the fundamental right to 
view non-obscene materials and held that individuals have, in the privacy of their own 
homes, a constitutional right to read and observe non-protected speech.  While the Court 
has made clear since Stanley that the First Amendment does not prevent laws to restrict 
the dissemination, as opposed to the possession, of obscene expression, it is not clear how 
these later holdings apply to the kind of expression suppressed in Ginsberg. 
11
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.  This rationale of the Court is further examined and 
critiqued infra Part I. 
12
 Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 960 (9th Cir. 2009). 
13
 Id. 
14
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637. 
3 
Court now insists on strict or at least intermediate scrutiny.15  The Court’s use of rational 
basis review in Ginsberg is sometimes explained by stressing the obscenity aspect of the 
case, since obscene expression is not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.16  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court conceded that the material before it in Ginsberg was 
“not obscene for adults,”17 and the Court never suggested that the material was 
unprotected speech.18  Therefore, the crucial question in Ginsberg was whether a state 
could restrict the dissemination of protected speech because of its content.   
Like the Ginsberg statute, the Entertainment Merchants statute imposes a content-
based restriction on constitutionally protected speech, specifically “violent” video games.  
The purpose of the Entertainment Merchants statute is to prevent harm that the material 
might cause to children.  If the Court decides to use Entertainment Merchants as an 
opportunity to rethink Ginsberg, it has several options. 
 The Court could confirm the basic Ginsberg holding and extend it by analogy to 
any material so long as a legislature “might rationally conclude” that exposure to the 
material constitutes an “abuse” of children that “might prevent their ʻgrowth into free and 
independent well-developed [people] and citizens.ʼ”19  Another option would be to affirm 
the holding of the Ninth Circuit and several other federal courts that Ginsberg is 
essentially limited to its facts and does not apply to non-sexual materials such as violent 
                                                 
15
 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.  The more relaxed “intermediate” level of scrutiny (and its 
greater deference to the legislature) would not seem applicable in a Ginsberg-type case 
because, in order for intermediate scrutiny to apply, the legislative burden on expression 
must be “content-neutral.”  See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989) (explaining that restrictions must be “justified without reference to the content of 
the regulated speech, . . . narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, 
and . . . leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.” 
(quoting Clark v. Cmty for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))) and 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).  See also Los Angeles v. Alameda 
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“[M]unicipal ordinances 
receive only intermediate scrutiny if they are content neutral.”).  However, the purported 
vice of the expression in Ginsberg was precisely the effect of the particular content upon 
those who were exposed to it.  See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811–12 (a law that “focuses only 
on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners . . .  is 
the essence of content-based regulation.”).  See also infra note 48. 
16
 See, e.g., Video Software, 556 F.3d at 959 (“Ginsberg is specifically rooted in the 
Court’s First Amendment obscenity jurisprudence, which relates to non-protected sex-
based expression . . . .”). 
17
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634.  
18
 The Court has since specifically recognized that its decision in Ginsberg approved the 
regulation of protected speech:  “We held in Ginsberg . . . that the government's interest 
in the ‘well-being of its youth’ and in supporting ‘parents' claim to authority in their own 
household’ justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.”  FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (emphasis added).   
19
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640–41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 
(1944)).  
4 
video games.20  There is, however, no obvious policy basis for making such a distinction.  
A third option would be to revisit Ginsberg’s reasoning and recast its rationale and 
holding in order to place this area of law on a firmer analytical basis, one that better 
accords with the rest of twenty-first century First Amendment jurisprudence.  
Whichever way the Supreme Court decides Entertainment Merchants, the case is 
an eminently suitable occasion to strengthen the footing of the First Amendment rights of 
minors.  It is well established that the state’s power to control children “reaches beyond 
the scope of its authority over adults.”21  However, Ginsberg, taken on its own terms, 
essentially leaves the First Amendment rights of children subject to any legislative 
impulse or whim that can survive rational basis review.22  In other words, as it stands, 
Ginsberg denies minors any meaningful First Amendment rights.23 
Part I of this article examines how Ginsberg’s reasoning is both circular and 
strikingly divergent from precedent in its view of legislative power. Part II will follow 
with a discussion of how the Court might analyze the problem and issues in Ginsberg if 
the case arose as a matter of first impression today. Finally, Part III will offer some 
thoughts on the basic policy issue underlying Ginsberg and Entertainment Merchants, 
namely, about the extent to which government should impose restrictions on the 
marketplace of ideas in an effort to shape teenage minds. 
 
I. 
Ginsberg on its own terms 
 
 The specific issue in Ginsberg was whether the operator of a stationery store 
could be punished for selling so-called “girlie” magazines to persons under seventeen 
years of age.24  The magazines were not “obscene for adults” because they did not meet 
the Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity.25  However, the Court noted, the New York 
                                                 
20
 See, e.g., Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Entm't Software 
Ass'n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Video Software Dealers Ass'n 
v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
21
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S at 165).  
22
 See infra text accompanying notes 73–76. 
23
 See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673 (arguing that the majority's reasoning seems to say that 
“the States and cities and counties and villages have unlimited power to withhold 
anything and everything that is written or pictorial from younger people.” (Fortas, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added)).  
24
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631.  The prosecution was based on then N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-
h (McKinney 1965).  The substance of this law is now covered by N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 
235.20–24 (McKinney 2008). 
25
 Id. at 634–35.  The Supreme Court's then-current formulation was drawn from Roth v. 
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and articulated in the 3-part Memoirs test for 
obscenity: 
 
5 
legislature had devised its own definition of obscenity for purposes of its ban on sales to 
underage persons, and the state’s definition was significantly more restrictive than the 
definition of obscenity formulated by the Supreme Court.26 
 In appealing his conviction, the defendant's “primary attack” was “leveled at the 
power of the State to adapt” the Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity by extending it 
to include additional material.27  Although the Ginsberg Court used the word “adapt,” the 
state was actually trying to expand the concept of obscenity to include a new class of 
material defined “on the basis of its appeal to minors,” and “thus exclude material so 
defined from the area of protected expression.”28  The defendant argued that a state 
legislature does not have the power to expand an existing category of unprotected 
expression and thus withdraw constitutional protection from previously protected 
expression.29  He asserted, in effect, that the states do not have the power to cut down the 
scope of a constitutional right by modifying a constitutional concept. 
 The Supreme Court disagreed.  Although the Court could have rendered its own 
ruling that expanded the definition of obscenity to include the material proscribed in § 
484-h of the New York Penal Law,30 it instead declared that the statute itself 
accomplished the expansion.  According to the Court, “§ 484-h . . . adjusts the definition 
of obscenity,” adding that it “seems” clear that “the State has power to make that 
                                                                                                                                                 
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient 
interest in sex;  
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community 
standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and  
(c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value. 
 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).  The Court’s current definition of 
obscenity is defined in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
26
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635.  The state’s definition added to the Supreme Court’s 
definition by including any depiction of “nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic 
abuse [that] is harmful to minors.”  § 484-h(2)(a).  Although the statute’s language 
seemed to define only what the statute prohibited, not the scope of a constitutional 
concept, the Supreme Court concluded that the state’s statute had adjusted the “definition 
of obscenity.”  Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.  
27
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635. 
28
 Id.  This statement accepts the Court’s assumption that New York's statute contained a 
provision “defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17 . . . .” Id. at 
638.  However, the New York statute did not explicitly contain any such provision.  See 
id. at 645–47 (setting out the statute).  That is to say, there was no language in the statute 
that purported to define obscenity or adjust its definition. However, the Court decided 
Ginsberg on the assumption that the statute did contain this language.  This assumption 
by the Court is central to Ginsberg’s reasoning, and that assumption continues through 
the present discussion.  . 
29
 Id. at 635. 
30
 See supra note 24. 
6 
adjustment . . . .”31  The Court thus declared that a state legislature has the power to 
redefine and limit the scope of a constitutional right.   
In support of this remarkable declaration, the Court cited Mishkin v. New York.32  
Mishkin held that, in recognition of “social realities,” materials aimed at a “clearly 
defined deviant sexual group” could be considered obscene even if they do not appeal to 
the prurient interest of an “average” person.33  Prior to Mishkin, only materials having 
prurient appeal to the average person were considered obscene.34 
Ginsberg cannot, however, be regarded as an application of Mishkin.  Unlike 
Ginsberg, Mishkin expressly stated that the Court itself was making the adjustment to the 
constitutional definition of obscenity.35  Mishkin did not even hint that a state legislature 
could modify the scope of constitutional rights on its own.  In Ginsberg, by contrast, the 
Court did not adjust the definition itself, but instead stated that the statute did the 
adjusting.   
Another important distinction is that Mishkin’s redefinition of obscenity changed 
the status of a class of expression (i.e., materials appealing to “deviant” sexual interests) 
from protected to unprotected; Ginsberg did not.36  In other words, the question in 
Mishkin was the scope of the Court’s own constitutional definition of obscenity.37  The 
wholly different question in Ginsberg was whether, to serve a legitimate state interest, a 
statute can restrict protected speech on the basis of its content. 
Today, the answer to this last question would be a conditional “yes” because states 
can restrict constitutionally protected speech based on content provided the restriction 
meets the Supreme Court’s standard of strict scrutiny.38  For a statute to pass strict 
                                                 
31
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (emphasis added).  Once again, the New York statute did not 
actually contain any language purporting to be a definition of “obscenity.”  
32
 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966). 
33
 Id.. at 508–09. 
34
 The requirement that there be prurient appeal to the average person came into 
constitutional jurisprudence in Roth.  Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.476, 489 (1957).  
Though it was not strictly speaking a part of the Memoirs formulation, it apparently was 
brought along with it.  See  Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
35
 Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 509. 
36
 The Mishkin Court withdrew protected status from “material [that] is designed for and 
primarily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than the public at 
large.” Id. at 508. 
37
 See supra note 25 for the Memoirs formulation. 
38
 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); see also 
Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 109, 126 (1989) (“The Government may, 
however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a 
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated 
interest.”).  The Court in Sable did not use the expression “strict scrutiny,” but the 
standard stated in the foregoing parenthetical is the strict scrutiny standard.  See infra text 
accompanying next footnote. 
7 
scrutiny, the government must demonstrate, among other things, that “the harms it recites 
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”39  
Ginsberg did not, however, employ strict scrutiny review.  Instead, on the pivotal 
question of whether material targeted by the statute was in fact “harmful to minors,”40 the 
Court used only highly deferential rational basis review.41  Its theory for using the 
rational basis standard was that “obscenity is not protected expression” and therefore, to 
deny protection to “material defined as obscenity” by the state “requires only that we be 
able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material 
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.”42  
Using the deferential rational basis standard, the Court had no trouble finding that 
a legislature “might rationally conclude . . . that exposure to the materials proscribed” 
might prevent minors from growing into “free and independent well-developed men and 
citizens.”43  Although the Court conceded that that the “studies all agree that a causal link 
                                                 
39
 See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 817 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) 
(commercial speech case applying intermediate scrutiny)); United States v. Nat'l Treasury 
Emps.Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995).  Note that Playboy was a strict-scrutiny case 
quoting, with approval, the evidentiary standard laid out in an intermediate-scrutiny case 
(Edenfield).  Presumably, the evidentiary standard for strict scrutiny should, if anything, 
be even more rigorous than the one for intermediate scrutiny and, therefore, the language 
quoted in the text would show the minimum rigor of evidentiary review for a strict-
scrutiny case.  For a fuller discussion of strict scrutiny for content-based restrictions on 
speech, see infra notes 105–113 and accompanying text. 
40
 According to  the statute at issue in Ginsberg:  
 
ʻHarmful to minorsʼ means that quality of any description or 
representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse, when it: 
 
(i) predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of 
minors, and 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as 
a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and 
(iii) is utterly without redeeming social importance for minors. 
 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h(1)(f) (McKinney 1965). 
41
 The Court stated, for example, that the limitations on expression would be justifiable as 
long as “it was rational for the legislature to find that the minors' exposure to such 
material might be harmful.” Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (emphasis 
added). 
42
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added).  
43
 Id. at 640–41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
8 
has not been demonstrated,”44 the state was not required to substantiate its asserted 
interest by showing that “the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact 
alleviate them to a material degree,” as it would be under today’s strict scrutiny 
analysis.45  Instead, the Court deemed it sufficient “that a causal link has not been 
disproved either.”46 “We . . . cannot say,” it concluded, “that § 484-h, in defining the 
obscenity of material on the basis of its appeal to minors under 17, has no rational 
relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm.”47  
Considering that Ginsberg was decided in 1968, it is unsurprising that the Court 
used rational basis review.  It would be years before the Court would delineate between 
the different levels of scrutiny (strict, intermediate and rational basis) in relation to First 
Amendment law48 or specifically hold that strict scrutiny applies in cases of content-
                                                 
44
 Id. at 642 (quoting C. Peter Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, 1996 SUP. 
CT. REV. 7, 52 (1996)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
45
 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (quoting  
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993) (commercial speech case applying 
intermediate scrutiny) (sexually-themed speech requires strict scrutiny); United States v. 
Nat'l Treasury Emps.Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) . See supra note 39. 
46
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642 (quoting C. Peter Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of 
Roth, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 7, 52 (1996)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
47
 Id. at 643. 
48
 The applicability of the heightened scrutiny to content-based regulations of expression 
did not begin to take shape until well after Ginsberg.  The Court was still saying in 1972, 
four years after Ginsberg, that “the First Amendment means that government has no 
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its 
content.”  Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (emphasis added).  
However, with a mind to the “discrimination” aspect of content-based restrictions, post-
Mosley cases borrowed from equal protection doctrine (already mentioned in Mosley) and 
allowed content-based restrictions to be imposed provided that “the legislation be finely 
tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any 
distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.”  Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461–
62 (1980).  See Sable Commc'ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 119, 126 (1989) (applying the 
rule to restrictions on sexually-themed speech).  However, the first instance I can find of 
the term “strict scrutiny” and its current formulation in a First Amendment case is in 
Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.  For an interesting and concise review of how strict scrutiny 
emerged as a First Amendment doctrine, see Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the 
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–29 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 Intermediate scrutiny first appeared in a majority opinion in the First Amendment 
context in Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994).  However, the 
elements of intermediate scrutiny go back to a case decided a month after Ginsberg, 
United States v O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), that applied what is now called 
intermediate scrutiny to a regulation of expressive conduct, viz. draft-card burning.  
Nothing in the Ginsberg opinion foreshadowed the soon-to-be-announced, but not  
named, intermediate standard of review.  However, intermediate review would not apply 
9 
based restrictions on sexually themed speech.49  According to the constitutional standards 
of the time, the only basis on which speech suppression was permissible was “a showing 
of the circumstances which lie behind the phrase ‘clear and present danger.’”50 
Although protected speech could not be suppressed absent a clear and present 
danger, the Court had held eleven years before Ginsberg, in Roth v. United States,51 that 
the government may impose restrictions on unprotected speech, such as obscenity, 
without such a danger.52  The only thing standing in the way of invoking the Roth 
exception as authority for using rational basis review in Ginsberg was that the magazines 
were not obscene under the Supreme Court’s definition.53  To get past this problem, the 
Court fit Ginsberg under the First Amendment’s obscenity exception by reasoning that 
“material defined as obscenity by § 484-h” counts as obscene.54  Therefore, the Court 
decided, a rational basis for restricting the material is all that is needed.55  
This reasoning does not, however, work.  In its effort to fit Ginsberg under the 
obscenity exception to First Amendment protection, the Court appeared to be playing a 
game of polysemy — deliberately labeling two different concepts with the same word as 
a way of gliding over the difference between them.  The two different concepts are (i) the 
constitutional concept of “obscenity” as defined by the Court,56 and (ii) the more 
capacious concept that results when the constitutional concept is expanded to include the 
“material defined as obscenity by § 484-h.”57  The problem with treating Ginsberg as a 
case of obscenity is that the material proscribed by the New York statute covered a 
substantial range of expression that is not obscenity as defined by the Court.  The 
expression targeted by the New York statute included constitutionally protected speech. 
There is only one way to regard Ginsberg as an obscenity case and, therefore, 
appropriate for lesser scrutiny, and that is to suppose that the constitutional definition of 
obscenity somehow came to include “material defined as obscenity by § 484-h.”58  The 
only way that inclusion could have occurred would be if the Court or the New York State 
Legislature had changed the constitutional definition of obscenity.  Despite the Court’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
to a case like Ginsberg today because the regulation there was pure content-based 
discrimination.   
49
 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813. 
50
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486–87 
(1957)).  See also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) 
(rejecting use of the rational basis test for cases involving freedoms of speech and press).  
51
 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  Roth was the first case to hold that there is an implicit exception 
for obscenity in the First Amendment.  
52
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641, 642 n.9.  Roth referred only to constitutionally excluded 
obscenity, and said nothing about variations on the obscenity concept that might be 
prescribed by statutes. 
53
 See supra text accompanying notes 16–18. 
54
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641. 
55
 See supra text accompanying notes 40–42. 
56
 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 338 U.S. 413, 418 (1966).   
57
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.   
58
 Id. 
10 
language,59 it is practically inconceivable it really meant to recognize a power in the state 
legislature to modify the scope of a constitutional right.  Accordingly, if a definitional 
change occurred the Court must have made the change itself.  However, the Ginsberg 
opinion nowhere said that the Court was making any such change, nor did it say it was 
adopting the New York formulation. On the contrary, the Court unmistakably said  
“§ 484-h . . . adjusts the definition of obscenity.”60  
In sum, there is a problem with treating Ginsberg as an obscenity case and 
explaining its use of rational basis review.  The problem is that materials like those at 
issue in Ginsberg remained non-obscene protected speech under the Supreme Court’s 
operative definitions.  The Supreme Court neither redefined the scope of the obscenity 
concept itself, nor did it say that it adopted the supposed redefinition61 in the statute as a 
constitutional formulation.62  Assuming that the state legislature lacked the power to 
modify the scope of constitutional right, the Court’s use of the rational basis test would 
not have been appropriate under the prevailing requirement of strict scrutiny review.  
 Even accepting the Court’s statement that the legislature had the power to adjust 
the definition of obscenity for constitutional purposes, there is still another problem with 
Ginsberg’s explanation for using rational basis review:  the core line of reasoning is 
circular.  The Court said that the § 484-h material was obscene because the legislature 
had power to redefine non-obscene material as obscene if it had a rational basis for doing 
so.  But the reason it needed only a rational basis to do so is that the § 484-h material was 
obscene.  In order to justify the use of rational basis review the Court had to assume the 
conclusion, that the § 484-h material was obscene. 
 In establishing the rational basis test as the one to use in cases involving the First 
Amendment rights of minors, Ginsberg produced an important constitutional rule by 
treating material as obscene based on the supposed power of a state legislature to “adjust” 
a constitutional concept.  Unless the Court itself adjusted its obscenity formulation, the 
material at issue in Ginsberg was protected speech restricted on the basis of content 
without the application of strict scrutiny. This situation raises, at the very least, serious 
questions about Ginsberg’s continued value as a precedent. 
 
                                                 
59
 Id. at 638 (insisting that the legislature made the “adjustment” in the definition of 
obscenity). 
60
 Id. 
61
 As noted earlier, the New York statute did not actually contain any language purporting 
to be a definition of obscenity.  However, since the Court decided Ginsberg on the 
assumption that it did, this assumption is continued in the present discussion. 
62
 A footnote in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214 n.10 (1975), stated 
that “[i]n Ginsberg the Court adopted a variation of the adult obscenity standards 
enunciated in Roth . . . and Memoirs . . . .” (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
However, the Court did not say that it had adopted the state’s formulation in the Ginsberg 
opinion itself.  Rather, all the opinion said was, in effect, that it could have been rational 
for the state to adopt it.  See supra text accompanying notes 40–42.  If the Court did 
indeed adopt a reformulation of its obscenity definition in either Ginsberg or Erznoznick, 
it did so implicitly. 
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II. 
Could Ginsberg be Decided the Same Way Today? 
 
 Despite its serious analytical flaws, Ginsberg produced a core holding that has 
been fairly clear.  First, the Court has said that Ginsberg approved the regulation of 
“otherwise protected expression”63 if “the government’s interest in the ‘well-being of its 
youth’ and in supporting parental authority” justifies the regulation.64  In relation to 
minors’ First Amendment rights to receive expressive material, Ginsberg established that 
“the scope of the constitutional freedom . . . to read or see material concerned with sex” 
can depend on the age of the person.65 
This core meaning of Ginsberg does not, however, provide much guidance for 
future cases.  In particular, Ginsberg neither tells us how watered down the First 
Amendment rights of minors actually are, nor does it offer any standards or principles 
other than the rational basis test for deciding that question..66  What is more, First 
Amendment law has evolved considerably since Ginsberg.  
The Entertainment Merchants case now before the Court freshly presents the 
same question as Ginsberg, namely, to what extent does the government’s interest in 
protecting minors permit regulations that deny minors First Amendment rights to 
communicate and receive communications?  If Ginsberg arose as a matter of first 
impression today, it is unlikely that it could be decided on the same reasoning.  In light of 
now-prevailing First Amendment law, the Entertainment Merchants case should not be 
decided on that reasoning either. 
Even if the reasoning of Ginsberg is flawed, however, there is still the question of 
what value its core meaning might retain as precedent.  Part II considers whether there 
are alternative ways to support Ginsberg’s basic holding today.  
 
 
 
                                                 
63
 FCC v. Pacifica Found. 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (describing Ginsberg).  
64
 Id. at 749–50 (quoting Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639–40).  As the Court has elaborated, 
Ginsberg established that there are “limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the 
speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the 
audience may include children,” and these limitations apply “even though the material in 
question was entitled to First Amendment protection with respect to adults.”  Bethel Sch. 
Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). 
65
 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864–65 (1997) (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636). 
Based on Reno, it appears that this aspect of Ginsberg has survived the landmark right-to-
read case, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), which was decided one year after 
Ginsberg. 
66
 Indeed, it does not even tell us who holds the power to decide.  Do the state legislatures 
have the power to modify the scope of minors’ First Amendment rights by making 
adjustments in the controlling constitutional definitions, as the Court suggested?  Or is 
that power held by the Supreme Court alone?  See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (“That the 
State has power to make that adjustment seems clear.”).  
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a. Rational Basis Review as an “Independent” Rule?  
 
The effort to justify the rational basis test in Ginsberg led to a most glaring 
deviation from modern First Amendment law, namely, letting a state legislature diminish 
the breadth of a constitutional right by expanding the definition of obscenity.67  This is 
not, one would think, an aspect of Ginsberg that could continue to apply.  
Perhaps, however, the Ginsberg opinion did not actually mean to say that state 
legislatures have the power to modify the scope of First Amendment rights.  The Court 
might have instead meant to adopt a so-called “variable obscenity” standard, which 
would permit the states some flexibility in complying with First Amendment 
requirements.68  Justice Brennan, who wrote for the Court in Ginsberg, later explained 
that the Court had done just that.69  The trouble is that if, indeed, the Court adopted a 
“variable obscenity” standard, it did not mention that it adoption anywhere in the final 
version of its opinion.70  No subsequent majority opinion has confirmed the existence of 
this novel, flexible standard and a correspondingly flexible constitutional right. 
The rational basis standard for cases involving minors does not, however, 
necessarily have to depend on the dubious notion that states can modify the scope of 
constitutional definitions and rights.  Instead, it is possible to read Ginsberg as 
establishing an independent rule that lesser scrutiny applies to laws aimed at preventing 
harm to minors.71  Under this alternative reading of Ginsberg, regulations to protect 
minors would simply be carved out from the general run of First Amendment cases and, 
                                                 
67
 See supra Part I. 
68
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 635–36.  The opinion noted that the “New York Court of Appeals 
‘upheld the Legislature’s power to employ variable concepts of obscenityʼ” in a prior 
case using the same law as was at issue in Ginsberg. Id. (citing People v. Tannenbaum, 
220 N.E.2d 783, 785 (N.Y. 1966)). 
69
 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Fortas 
also mentions the “variable obscenity” concept in his Ginsberg dissent, making it sound 
very much as though it had been embraced in an earlier draft of the majority opinion but 
was later redacted.  Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673.  The Ninth Circuit apparently thought that 
the Court had adopted a variable obscenity standard as well.  Video Software Dealers 
Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 953, 957–58 (9th Cir. 2009). 
70
 In a footnote, the Court quoted a law review article that argued that “[v]ariable 
obscenity . . . furnishes a useful analytical tool,”  Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 n.4 (quoting 
William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing 
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 85 (1960–61)), but the references to 
variable obscenity in the majority opinion fall far short of even the most oblique adoption 
of a new constitutional standard.   
71
 Indeed, this is exactly how Justice Brennan, the author of Ginsberg, appears later to 
have understood it.  See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1980) 
(citing Ginsberg and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)) (“lesser scrutiny is 
appropriate . . . because of the States’ greater latitude to regulate the conduct of 
children”).  
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as to them, the rational basis test would be deemed the applicable standard for reviewing 
abridgments of speech.  
There are, however, several objections to reading Ginsberg as establishing an 
independent rule for using rational basis review for laws that affect minors’ First 
Amendment rights.  First of all, Ginsberg neither considered nor made any effort to 
justify such an independent rule.  Although the Court gave good reasons why the First 
Amendment rights of minors may be less extensive than those of adults,72 it gave no 
explanation (apart from its obscenity theory) why, as a matter of process, laws affecting 
minors should receive less rigorous scrutiny than restrictions on speech generally.   
A stronger objection to a special low-scrutiny rule for minors is that its practical 
effect would be to place the First Amendment rights of young people almost totally at the 
pleasure of the legislature — meaning that minors would effectively have no real First 
Amendment rights at all.73  By authorizing the use of highly deferential rational basis 
review, the Court would give legislatures a green light to move whole classes of 
expression into categorical exclusions such as obscenity.  
Moving a class of expression into a categorical exclusion allows a legislature to 
bypass strict scrutiny.74  It would undermine the integrity of the strict scrutiny 
requirement if new laws could remove classes of speech from its purview without 
themselves being subject to strict scrutiny.75  As Justice Fortas wrote in his Ginsberg 
dissent, “[t]he Court certainly cannot mean that the States and cities and counties and 
villages have unlimited power to withhold anything and everything that is written or 
pictorial from younger people.”76  But if the deferential rational basis test of Ginsberg 
applies to cases involving minors, that “unlimited power” would be exactly the result.  It 
would create a veritable road around First Amendment protection for persons under 
eighteen years of age. 
                                                 
72
 For example, the court discussed Prince.  Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638–39. 
73
 See Landmark Commc'ns v. Virginia., 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978) (“A legislature 
appropriately inquires into and may declare the reasons impelling legislative action but 
the judicial function commands analysis of whether the specific conduct charged falls 
within the reach of the statute and if so whether the legislation is consonant with the 
Constitution.  Were it otherwise, the scope of freedom of speech and of the press would be 
subject to legislative definition and the function of the First Amendment as a check on 
legislative power would be nullified.”) (emphasis added). 
74
 Strict scrutiny is not required for restrictions on expression that falls within a 
categorical exclusion from First Amendment protection.  Compare United States v. 
Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (A “content-based speech restriction . . 
. can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.”) with Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
486–87 (1957) (no justifications for restriction need be shown if a categorical exclusion 
applies).  See also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 298 (2008) (expressions of 
offers to provide child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) 
(child pornographic expression).  
75
 See supra note 73. 
76
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673 (Fortas, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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Another objection to an independent rule applying rational-basis review is that it 
would be directly at odds with several post-Ginsberg decisions.77  For example, in Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,78 the Court showed no inclination 
to reverse the First Amendment presumption of invalidity because minors were involved.   
 
“Students in school . . . are ‘persons' under our Constitution. . . . They may 
not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that are officially 
approved.  In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid 
reasons to regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of 
expression of their views.”79   
 
True, the Tinker case dealt with communications by minors, not communications to 
minors (and, inferentially, their right to receive such communications), but the Supreme 
Court has never, at least yet, given any indication that the First Amendment interests in 
receiving expressive content are inferior to the interests in providing it.  Only by 
dubiously regarding Ginsberg as an obscenity case was it possible for the Court to justify 
the use of rational basis review. 
In the 1989 case of Sable Communications v. FCC, the Court held exactly the 
opposite as Ginsberg with respect to the applicable level of review.  Like Ginsberg, Sable 
involved a law that was intended to prevent the dissemination of sexual material to 
minors, specifically “dial-a-porn.” To do so, the law in Sable placed content-based 
restrictions on “indecent” telephone communications.80  Sable followed Ginsberg in part, 
acknowledging that government has “a compelling interest in protecting the physical and 
psychological well-being of minors,” which “extends to shielding minors from the 
influence of literature that is not obscene by adult standards.”81  However, the Court 
departed from Ginsberg by prescribing a test that amounts to what we now call strict 
scrutiny.82 “[T]o withstand constitutional scrutiny,” wrote the Court, government must 
use “narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily 
interfering with First Amendment freedoms.”83  Even more pertinently, the Court stated 
                                                 
77
 E.g., Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 (2000) (requiring strict scrutiny review of content-based 
restrictions for the purpose of prevent access by minors to sexually-themed television 
programming); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (applying the “most stringent 
review” to a content-based restriction on speech); Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 
492 U.S. 119, 126 (1989) (using today’s strict scrutiny standards in reviewing regulation 
to prevent exposure of minors to sexually-themed speech). 
78
 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
79
 Id. at 511 (emphasis added). 
80
 Sable, 492 U.S. at 117–18, 123.  The Court at some points referred to the regulation as 
a “ban,” but in fact only communications for commercial purposes were banned.  Id. at 
123. 
81
 Id. at 126. 
82
 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).  See also infra text 
accompanying note 105. 
83
 Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (quoting Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976)). 
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that “whatever deference is due legislative findings would not foreclose our independent 
judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional law.”84  “Deference to a 
legislative finding,” wrote the Court, “cannot limit judicial inquiry when First 
Amendment rights are at stake.”85  At least since 1989, to uphold a law cutting back free 
expression interests to protect minors it is not enough merely to be “able to say that it was 
not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned by the 
statute is harmful to minors.”86 
 The use of rational-basis review in First Amendment cases involving minors is 
also at odds with United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,87 where the Court left no 
doubt that “a content-based speech restriction . . . can stand only if it satisfies strict 
scrutiny.”88  Like Sable and Ginsberg, Playboy concerned a law intended to prevent 
sexual material, in this instance sexual cable television programming, from reaching 
minors.89  While the Court in Playboy clearly focused on the law as a “restriction of 
communication between speakers and willing adult listeners”90 its broad pronouncements 
about First Amendment policy and goals did not except minors.  “[W]ere we to give the 
Government the benefit of the doubt when it attempted to restrict speech,” wrote the 
Court, “we would risk leaving regulations in place that sought to shape our unique 
personalities or to silence dissenting ideas.”91  Thus, the Court stated flatly, “[c]ontent-
based regulations are presumptively invalid,” and that “the usual presumption of 
constitutionality . . . is reversed.”92  
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear since Ginsberg, if it was not already 
clear before,93 that when laws restrict speech on the basis of content, strict scrutiny 
applies94—even if, as in Sable,95 Reno,96and Playboy,97 the purpose of the law is to 
                                                 
84
 Id. at 129. 
85
 Id. (quoting Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978)). 
86
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641 (emphasis added).  For more quotations stating the 
applicable standards for substantiating harm, see infra text accompanying notes 109–111. 
87
 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
88
 Id. at 813. 
89
 Id. at 806. 
90
 Id. at 812 (“To prohibit this much speech is a significant restriction of communication 
between speakers and willing adult listeners, communication which enjoys First 
Amendment protection.”) (emphasis added). 
91
 Id. at 818. 
92
 Id. at 817; accord, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-
based regulations are presumptively invalid.”); cf. e.g. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda 
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434, 449 (2002) (plurality opinion & Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(recognizing same rule); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986) (same). 
93
 See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957);  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (rejecting use of the rational basis test for cases involving 
freedoms of speech and press). 
94
 Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (“Where a law is 
subjected to a colorable First Amendment challenge, the rule of rationality which will 
sustain legislation against other constitutional challenges typically does not have the 
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restrict access to sexual materials by minors.  Use of the rational basis standard is also at 
odds with rule that content-based restrictions on speech and press are presumptively 
invalid.98  Certainly, if Ginsberg were decided today, something more than its flawed and 
circular reasoning99 should be required to overcome the holdings and strong statements of 
First Amendment goals and policies contained in cases that have since been decided. 
Finally, a special rule of lesser scrutiny for cases involving minors is inconsistent 
with the principle that “only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may 
government bar public dissemination of protected materials” to minors.100  In fact, such a 
rule for minors would effectively defeat this principle in practice.  It is one thing to say 
that “a State or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on communicative 
materials available to youths than on those available to adults,”101 but it is impermissible 
to give the state or municipality the final say on such controls.  Only if there is genuine 
scrutiny over governmental restrictions on expression by and to minors can the 
restrictions be confined to “relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances.”102  
In summary, it would be problematic to apply Ginsberg today as precedent for the 
proposition that lesser scrutiny is appropriate for First Amendment cases involving 
dissemination of expression to minors.  No doubt the states have “greater latitude to 
regulate the conduct of children,”103 but that broad truism says nothing about the standard 
to be used in deciding the limits on that latitude.  Ginsberg regarded restrictions on 
expression to be justifiable as long as it was “rational for the legislature to find that the 
minors' exposure to such material might be harmful.”104  In that respect, Ginsberg’s 
reasoning is out of step with modern First Amendment jurisprudence, even as to minors, 
and should not be applied in the pending Entertainment Merchants case. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
same controlling force.”).  See also Playboy, 529 U.S. at 81; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382; 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
116 (1991).   
95
 See Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 119, 126 (1989) (applying strict 
scrutiny to a regulation to prevent exposure of minors to sexually-themed speech). 
96
 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (applying the “most stringent review” to 
a content-based restriction on speech in the Internet context). 
97
 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
98
 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  The rational-basis test of constitutional 
validity inherently embodies exactly the opposite presumption – specifically, the 
presumption that the statute is valid unless no “state of facts reasonably can be conceived 
that would sustain” it.  Borden’s Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934). 
99
 See supra Part I. 
100
 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–13 (1975). 
101
 Id. at 212. 
102
 Id. at 212–13. 
103
 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 n.15 (1980). 
104
 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (emphasis added). 
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b. Ginsberg under the strict scrutiny standard.  
 
The Court's explanation of Ginsberg as a rational basis case does not per se mean 
it could not come out the same way if analyzed under the modern “strict scrutiny” 
standard.  Under strict scrutiny, a content-based restriction “must be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest,” and there must be no “less restrictive 
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose.”105  
In the Ginsberg context, the element of “compelling interest” should be easy to 
meet.  Indeed, the Ginsberg Court identified two interests that could potentially serve as 
the “compelling” interests that, if substantiated, would satisfy strict scrutiny today.106  
They were:  (1) the state’s interest in supporting parents and others, such as teachers, who 
have primary responsibility for the well-being of children, and (2) the state’s 
“independent interest in the well-being of its youth.”107   
The crucial question, however, is whether the alleged harm on which these two 
interests are predicated exists in fact.  The Ginsberg Court admitted it was “very 
doubtful” that the crucial legislative finding of harm “expresses an accepted scientific 
fact.”108  Nonetheless, it accepted that finding anyway.  Whatever else may be said of 
such reasoning, it is not “strict scrutiny.”   
Today, in order for a statute to pass strict scrutiny (or even intermediate scrutiny), 
“the Government . . . must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely 
conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and 
material way.”109  Rather than simply defer to the legislature as it did in Ginsberg, the 
Court must use its “independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of 
constitutional law.”110  It must “assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has 
drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.”111  
In short, the Court “may not simply assume that the ordinance will always 
advance the asserted state interests sufficiently to justify its abridgment of expressive 
activity.”112  On the contrary, 
 
[A law that burdens free expression] requires a justification far stronger 
than mere speculation about serious harms.  “Fear of serious injury cannot 
                                                 
105
 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted).  
106
 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639. 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id. at 641. 
109
 United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995) (quoting 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
110
 Sable Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) (emphasis added). 
111
 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (Kennedy, J., plurality) 
(applying O'Brien test). 
112
 Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 496 (1986) (quoting Members 
of the City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 n.22 
(1984)) (emphasis added). 
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alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.  Men feared 
witches and burnt women. . . . To justify suppression of free speech there 
must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free 
speech is practiced.”113 
 
 It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether there is adequate scientific 
evidence to support a conclusion that viewing erotic materials is harmful to minors, and 
to teens in particular.  If there is not, then Ginsberg could not on its record be decided the 
same way today using the now-prevailing strict scrutiny standard for content-based 
regulations of speech.  Likewise, the outcome of the Entertainment Merchants case 
should depend on whether there is adequate scientific evidence to support a conclusion 
that playing “violent” video games is harmful to teens. 
 
III. 
Ginsberg and Mind Control for Teens 
 
Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power 
to control men's minds.114 
 
 Reduced to its basics, the central policy question in Ginsberg was whether and to 
what extent government should be able to control what minors see, read, and hear.  While 
there is good reason to think that government control of teenage minds is a generally bad 
thing, there are undoubtedly many who see value in such control.  Arguably, at least, 
government should not simply leave the development of teenagers’ personalities, tastes, 
attitudes, and values to their families, parents and other people in their lives.  Rather, one 
could argue, government exists not just to serve its citizens but to shape them as well.  
The idea that government has a legitimate role in shaping teenagers’ personalities, tastes, 
attitudes and values by limiting what they see and hear is usually expressed with calls for 
restricting minors’ access to certain kinds of expressive material and in legislation 
responding to those calls.115   
While the Supreme Court has never found an “indoctrination exception” to the 
First Amendment, some of the reasoning in the public school cases inferentially suggests 
there might be.116  Nonetheless, though the point will not be argued here, it is submitted 
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 Nat'l Treasury, 513 U.S. at 475 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
114
 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). 
115
 For example, see the portion of the Communications Decency Act, codified in 47 
U.S.C § 223, quoted in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859 (1997) (invalidating the 
provision as overbroad).   
116
 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (allowing school to ban 
advocacy of illegal drug use given the “special characteristics of the school 
environment”); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988) (allowing 
school officials to regulate the contents of a school newspaper “in any reasonable 
manner”); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (upholding ban on 
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that the school cases, given their language and logic, neither expressly nor implicitly 
suggest the existence of some sort of “indoctrination exception” to the First Amendment.  
Their holdings are animated, rather, by a recognition of the “special characteristics of the 
school environment” and the need to prevent disruption of the schools’ educational 
work.117  So while it may be clear that the public schools have a legitimate role in 
educating as to values,118 the cases do not do support the idea that government has an 
indoctrination interest that allows it to restrict expression as a way to suppress alternative 
values.  “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion. . . .”119 
 Depending on how one comes out on questions like these, one may or may not be 
persuaded that Ginsberg represented a step in the right direction.  Stated in First 
Amendment terms, one may or may not think that there is a compelling governmental 
interest in shielding teenagers from the social and cultural influences that might cause 
them to develop outlooks and viewpoints on sex or other topics that the government 
regards as “wrong.” 
 Whether or not such a compelling interest exists, the problem with Ginsberg is 
that its rational basis test provides no vehicle for judicial examination of the issue or for 
assuring that such government interests, if they exist, are furthered in an appropriately 
speech-protective way.  Instead, the present Ginsberg rule permits Congress, state and 
even local legislatures to impose wholesale embargoes on what young people may see, 
read and hear.  It gives legislative bodies an essentially free hand to obstruct teens’ access 
to essentially any kind of material the legislators might decide does “harm.”  
 Wholesale embargoes on speech and expression for the purpose of shaping minds 
would, of course, never be tolerated for general audiences.120  On the contrary, 
individuals have a fundamental right to view and observe material of their own choosing 
even if the government officials have concerns about the impact on the minds of those 
who see it.121  Whether such embargoes should be permitted in the case of teens is a 
different question.122  Consistently safeguarding First Amendment interests is not a duty 
                                                                                                                                                 
sexually suggestive student speech that would “undermine the school's basic educational 
mission”).   
117
 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 394. 
118
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 Id. at 565 (denying that the state has “the right to protect the individual's mind from 
the effects” even of unprotected speech, i.e. obscenity).  The Constitution exists precisely 
so that opinions and judgments, including aesthetic and moral judgments about art and 
literature, can be formed, tested, and expressed.  What the Constitution says is that these 
judgments are for the individual to make, not for the Government to decree, even with the 
mandate or approval of a majority.  United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 
818 (2000). 
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that the courts can leave exclusively to the legislative branch.123  As the Court has stated, 
“[i]n most circumstances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less 
applicable when government seeks to control the flow of information to minors.”124  As 
long as freedom of expression is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny should apply 
whenever legislatures regulate on the basis of content. 
Presumably, the chief harm posed to teens by non-obscene sexual material might 
is that it might cause them to get “wrong” ideas, attitudes or values concerning sex. 
Assuming that the government has the “right” ideas, attitudes and values on sexual 
matters, this is a kind of harm that government could have an interest in trying to prevent.  
On the other hand, the reliability of government expertise on questions of sex is 
something a person may doubt.  And it must not be forgotten that minors can also suffer 
harm by being deprived of access to free expression.125  It is, after all, a presupposition of 
the First Amendment that reading and observing the expression of others is beneficial.126  
There is ordinarily a First Amendment interest in protecting that access, an interest that is 
strong enough to merit protection by the standard of strict scrutiny to protect the rights of 
minors. 
 
IV. 
Conclusion 
 
In deciding Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association, the 
Supreme Court will have to grapple with how to apply Ginsberg v. New York.127 Rather 
than gloss over or ignore the analytical flaws of Ginsberg, the Court should take the 
occasion to rethink Ginsberg and to place minors’ constitutional rights on a sounder 
footing that is in harmony with the rest of First Amendment law.  
Using the rational basis test, Ginsberg could not be decided on the same reasoning 
today nor could it have reached the same result.  The Court’s choice to use lesser scrutiny 
to review a law impinging on First Amendment interests is inconsistent with cases 
decided since Ginsberg and the requirement of strict scrutiny that they establish.128  The 
only way its reasoning could hold is if the state legislature actually had the power (as 
Ginsberg asserted) to modify the scope of constitutional protections by redefining a key 
constitutional concept – namely, obscenity.  Despite Ginsberg’s language, it is  
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inconceivable that the Supreme Court would recognize such a power in a state legislature 
today.  Therefore, in the absence of some new, independent principle (of which the Court 
has not yet even hinted), the Ginsberg decision to use the rational basis test is without a 
sound foundation under modern First Amendment law.  
Bringing this area of law into harmony with the rest of First Amendment law 
would mean that, in reviewing content-based restrictions intended to protect minors (such 
as those in Entertainment Merchants), the courts should apply the same presumption of 
invalidity and strict scrutiny that are applicable to content-based restrictions enacted for 
other purposes.129  That is to say, content-based restrictions to protect minors must be 
“narrowly tailored” to promote a “compelling Government interest,” with no “less 
restrictive alternative,”130 and in substantiating that interest “the Government . . . must 
demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation 
will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”131 
Ultimately, the policy concern in cases like Ginsberg and Entertainment 
Merchants involves governmental efforts to imbue young people with attitudes, outlooks, 
and viewpoints toward sex and depictions of violence that fall within a certain officially 
approved range.  Whether the youth of today will eventually conform to these officially 
fostered attitudes, outlooks and viewpoints as the adults of tomorrow is, of course, an 
open question but, if history is a guide, they probably will not. 
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content on those who were exposed to it. 
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